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Abstract We typically judge that hasteners are causes of what they hasten, while
delayers are not causes of what they delay. These judgements, I suggest, are sen-
sitive to an underlying metaphysical distinction. To see this, we need to pay
attention to a relation that I call positive security-dependence, where an event E
security-depends positively on an earlier event C just in case E could more easily
have failed to occur if C had not occurred. I suggest that we judge that an event C is
a cause of a later event E only if E security-depends positively on C. This explains
our causal judgements in typical cases of hastening and delaying as well as in
atypical cases, where we judge that hasteners are not causes of what they hasten or
that delayers are causes of what they delay.
Keywords Causation  Hastening  Delaying
1 Introduction
There is a puzzling asymmetry in our causal judgements about hasteners and
delayers: we typically (though not always) judge that hasteners are causes of what
they hasten, while delayers are not causes of what they delay.1 This asymmetry is
seen, for example, in our judgements about the following two cases:
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Hastened forest fire: There is dry weather in April, followed by lightning in
May and again in June. The lightning strike in May starts a forest fire.
However, if the forest had not burned in May, it would have burned in June,
because of the June lightning.
Delayed forest fire: There is heavy rain in April, followed by lightning in May
and again in June. In May, the forest is too wet to burn. In June, however, the
lightning strike starts a forest fire. If there had not been heavy rain in April, the
situation would have been as in Hastened forest fire, and the forest would have
burned already in May.2
In Hastened forest fire, the May lightning hastens the burning of the forest: if the
May lightning had not occurred, the forest would have burned later—in June instead
of May.3 Reflecting this, we judge that the May lightning is a cause of the forest fire.
In Delayed forest fire, by contrast, the heavy rain in April delays the forest fire: with
the heavy rain in April, the forest burns in June; if there had not been heavy rain in
April, the forest would have burned already in May. Correspondingly, we judge that
the April rain is not a cause of the forest fire; instead, the correct verdict here seems
to be that the forest burns in spite of the heavy rain in April.
This asymmetry in our judgements about hasteners and delayers is puzzling
because it seems that the metaphysical situation is symmetric (Schaffer 2005: 306):
except for the fact that hasteners make the effect occur earlier, while delayers make
the effect occur later, hasteners seem to be related to what they hasten in exactly the
same way as delayers are related to what they delay. If the May lightning had not
occurred, the forest would still have burned—it would simply have burned later.
Similarly, if the April rain had not occurred, the forest would still have burned—it
would simply have burned earlier. The only difference, it seems, is that hasteners
make events happen earlier, while delayers make them happen later. And as Mackie
asks (1992: 486): ‘Why should moving something to an earlier time count as
causing it, while moving it to a later time does not?’
Based on this, it may seem that the best we can do is to give a pragmatic
explanation of why we intuitively treat hasteners and delayers differently. Schaffer
(2005: 306), for example, suggests the following pragmatic explanation:
Perhaps the hastener/delayer asymmetry can be explained away pragmati-
cally. […] Our intuitions are asymmetric, I propose, because: (i) we have an
intuitive image of ourselves as agents intervening in the course of events, (ii)
hasteners close opportunities for further intervention whereas delayers open
them, and (iii) we are more concerned with closing opportunities because of
the finality involved. Finalizing feels more salient than postponing.
2 These cases were originally presented by Bennett (1987: 373).
3 Is the forest fire that would have occurred in June the same event as the forest fire that actually occurs in
May? So far, I simply assume that it is. However, I provide arguments for this assumption in my
discussion of fragility in Sect. 2.
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This explanation appeals directly to the surface level characteristics of hasteners and
delayers: that hasteners make events happen earlier, while delayers make events
happen later. However, any explanation based on these surface level characteristics
runs into trouble when confronted with atypical cases of hastening and delaying,
where we intuitively judge that a hastener is not a cause of the event it hastens, or a
delayer is a cause of the event it delays. Consider for example the two cases below:
The holiday: Suzy is planning to go to Greece in October. However, the
teaching schedule for October is changed so that she is unable to go in
October. She reschedules her trip and goes to Greece in September instead.
(Cf. Mackie 1992: 485).
Fatal antidote: Billy is bitten by a snake and is promptly taken to hospital,
where he is given the antidote. Twelve hours after the snakebite, he dies from
a reaction to the antidote. If he had not been given the antidote, he would have
died from the snake’s poison already two hours after the snakebite. (Cf.
Mackie 1992: 485).
In The holiday, the change in the October teaching schedule hastens Suzy’s trip to
Greece. Even so, it seems intuitively correct to say that the change in the October
teaching schedule is not a cause of her trip—rather, we might say, she manages to
go to Greece in spite of the change in the teaching schedule. In Fatal antidote, on
the other hand, the antidote delays Billy’s death. Even so, it seems intuitively
correct to say that the antidote is a cause of his death.
A satisfactory explanation of the asymmetry in our judgements about hasteners
and delayers must be able to account for these atypical cases as well. Thus, the
asymmetry in our judgements cannot be explained simply as a result of the fact that
hasteners make what they hasten happen earlier, while delayers make what they
delay happen later.
In this paper, I am going to suggest a new explanation of the asymmetry in
our judgements. In brief, my suggestion is that our causal judgements are
sensitive to an underlying metaphysical distinction between three different ways
in which an earlier event C may be related to a later event E. The distinction
between these three relations may be drawn reductively, i.e. without appealing to
causal notions. To see the distinction, we need to pay attention to the modal
features of the later event E. More precisely, we need to pay attention to E’s
degree of security. I give a precise characterisation of degree of security in
Sect. 3. For now, however, the following rough characterisation is sufficient: an
event has a low degree of security when it could easily have failed to occur,
whereas it has a high degree of security when it could not easily have failed to
occur. Based on how C influences E’s degree of security, we may then
distinguish the following three relations:
(1) Positive security-dependence is, roughly, the relation that holds between C and
E when E would have been less secure if C had not occurred,
(2) Security-independence is, roughly, the relation that holds between C and
E when E would have been just as secure if C had not occurred, and
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(3) Negative security-dependence is, roughly, the relation that holds between
C and E when E would have been more secure if C had not occurred.
As I will suggest (and explain in detail in the following sections), our causal
judgements are sensitive to this metaphysical distinction: we judge that an event
C is a cause of a later event E only if E security-depends positively on C. This, in
turn, explains the asymmetry in our judgements about hasteners and delayers.
In typical cases, the surface-level distinction between hastening and delaying lines
up with the above metaphysical distinction, so that a hastened event typically
security-depends positively on the event that hastens it, while a delayed event
typically does not security-depend positively on the event that delays it. In Hastened
forest fire, for example, the forest fire security-depends positively on the May
lightning: if the May lightning had not occurred, the forest fire would have been less
secure. However, in exactly those atypical cases where we judge that a hastener is not
a cause of the event it hastens, and that a delayer is a cause of the event it delays, we
correspondingly find that the hastened event does not security-depend positively on
the event that hastens it, while the delayed event does security-depend positively on
the event that delays it. In The holiday, for example, we find that Suzy’s trip to Greece
security-depends negatively on the change in the October teaching schedule, while in
Fatal antidote, we find that Billy’s death security-depends positively on his being
given the antidote. In this way, the deep metaphysical distinction between positive
security-dependence, security-independence, and negative security-dependence can
explain our judgements in both typical and atypical cases of hastening and delaying.
I will proceed as follows: in Sect. 2, I discuss the preliminary question of the
fragility of events. In Sect. 3, I introduce the concept of security. In Sect. 4, I build on
this to introduce the relations of positive security-dependence, security-independence,
and negative security-dependence. In Sect. 5, I show that, in typical cases of
hastening, the hastened event security-depends positively on the event that hastens it,
whereas, in typical cases of delaying, the delayed event security-depends negatively
on the event that delays it. In Sect. 6, I consider atypical cases of hastening and
delaying. I begin by showing that, in the atypical cases presented above, the hastened
event security-depends negatively on the event that hastens it, while the delayed event
security-depends positively on the event that delays it. I then discuss a further kind of
atypical case, where the hastened (or delayed) event is simply security-independent
from the event that hastens (or delays) it. Finally, in Sect. 7, I discuss why the relation
of positive security-dependence almost always holds between a hastened event and
the event that hastens it, while the relation of negative security-dependence almost
always holds between a delayed event and the event that delays it.
2 Hastening, delaying, and the question of fragility
In the following, I will assume that the causal relata are events.4 My aim in this
section is to clarify my position on the question of the fragility of events.
4 This assumption is made in the vast majority of analyses of causation (see e.g. Paul and Hall 2013: 7).
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The concept of fragility was originally introduced by Lewis (1986a: 196), who
characterised it as follows:
Call an event fragile if, or to the extent that, it could not have occurred at a
different time, or in a different manner. A fragile event has a rich essence; it
has stringent conditions of occurrence.
Following Lewis, let us say that an event that does not have such stringent
conditions of occurrence is modally robust (Lewis 1986a: 196).
Thus, the question of fragility is a question about which features of an event are
essential to it, and which features are merely accidental. Consider, for example, the
forest fire that in fact occurs in June (in Delayed forest fire). Could this forest fire—
the very same event—have occurred earlier or later, or does it have its time of
occurrence essentially? Could it have started from a different tree, and spread more
slowly or rapidly, or is its manner of occurrence essential to it?
In the following, I will adopt Lewis’s view on the question of fragility, since his
view allows us to capture the nuances of our intuitive judgements about hasteners
and delayers.5 On Lewis’s view, there is, in any given region of space–time, a
multitude of events that differ only in their fragility, i.e. that differ only in terms of
what is essential to their occurrence, and what is merely accidental (see Lewis
1986a: 196–197; cf. Lewis 1986b). Consider, for example, the region of space–time
where the June forest fire occurs. On Lewis’s view, there is a multitude of events
located in this region of space–time. Among these, there is a fairly fragile event—a
forest fire that occurs essentially in June, essentially spreads from a particular old
tree, etc. And there is a much more robust event—a forest fire that is essentially the
burning of this particular forest, but which only accidentally occurs in June, only
accidentally spreads from this particular old tree, etc.
This view nicely accommodates our intuitive judgements about hasteners and
delayers: it allows us to capture the judgement that there is a possible reading of the
claim that ‘the April rain is a cause of the forest fire’ on which it comes out true;
and, at the same time, it allows us to capture the (much more natural) judgement that
the heavy rain in April merely delays the forest fire, and does not cause it.
Let me begin by showing how Lewis’s view accommodates the intuition that
there is some sense in which the heavy rain in April is a cause of the June forest fire.
Lewis’s view accommodates this by allowing for fairly fragile events. In the present
case, for example, Lewis’s view allows for the existence of a fairly fragile forest
fire, which has its manner and time of occurrence essentially: it is essential to it that
it occurs in June, starts from that particular old tree, spreads in this particular way,
etc. Call this fairly fragile event fragile June fire. The occurrence of fragile June fire
depends counterfactually on the heavy rain in April: if there had not been heavy rain
in April, fragile June fire would not have occurred at all. Instead, a numerically
5 My main reasons for adopting Lewis’s proposal in the following is that it is simple, most readers may
be expected to be familiar with it, and it can accommodate the data that I need to accommodate. It is
important to note, however, that the data may also be accommodated by more sophisticated proposals
about the causal relata, and what I say in the following may easily be applied within the framework of
such proposals.
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distinct forest fire would have occurred: a forest fire taking place already in May,
originating (maybe) from a different tree, spreading in a different way, etc. If we
take ourselves to be speaking of the fragile June fire, we should therefore say that
the April rain is a cause of the forest fire. Indeed, this follows directly from the
highly plausible principle that counterfactual dependence is sufficient for causation.
Usually, however, we are not interested in events with such stringent conditions
of occurrence. Lewis (2004: 86) makes this point as follows:
we’re usually quite happy to say that an event might have been slightly
delayed, and that it might have differed somewhat in this or that of its
contingent aspects. I recently postponed a seminar talk from October to
December, doubtless making quite a lot of difference to the course of the
discussion. But I postponed it instead of cancelling it because I wanted that
very event to take place.
When we, for example, judge that the heavy rain in April delays the forest fire, we
are not considering fragile June fire, which has its time and manner of occurrence
essentially. Instead, to make sense of the idea that events can be hastened or
delayed, we need to consider events that are much more robust—events whose
precise time and manner of occurrence are not essential to them.
To capture the judgement that the April rain delays the forest fire, for example,
we need to consider a fairly robust event: a forest fire that is essentially the burning
of this particular forest, but whose precise time and manner of occurrence are not
essential to it—it could have occurred in May or July instead of June, it could have
started from a lightning strike hitting a different tree, it could have spread more
slowly or rapidly, etc. Call this event robust forest fire. Considering this fairly robust
event allows us to capture the judgement that the heavy rain in April delays the
forest fire: if there had not been heavy rain in April, robust forest fire—that very
event—would have occurred already in May; because of the heavy rain in April, it
occurs later. Furthermore, it seems intuitively clear that the April rain is not a cause
of robust forest fire.
In the following, I will focus on fairly robust events, such as robust forest fire.
Firstly, as noted above, it is only appropriate to speak of hastening and delaying
when we are considering such fairly robust events. And secondly and more
importantly, the puzzling asymmetry between hasteners and delayers only comes
into view when we consider such fairly robust events: when we consider fragile
events that have their time of occurrence essentially, any prior event that influences
their timing must be counted among their causes. It is only when we consider fairly
robust events, which could have occurred earlier or later, that the asymmetry
emerges. Here, the question arises: why do we judge, when we consider robust
forest fire, that the hastening lightning strike in May is among its causes, while the




I suggest that the key to understanding the asymmetry between hasteners and
delayers is to look at a particular modal feature of events, namely how easily they
could have failed to occur. In this section, I will introduce the concept of security,
which provides a precise way of capturing this idea.
Before we can ask how easily an event could have failed to occur, we first need to
specify which event we are talking about. Given the view presented in Sect. 2, there
is, for each possible answer to the question of fragility, an event that fits exactly that
answer. There is, for example, a fragile forest fire that has its time and manner of
occurrence essentially; another more robust forest fire, which is essentially the
burning of this particular forest, but could have happened at a somewhat different
time and in a somewhat different manner, etc. To pick out a single event, it is
therefore not enough to point to the space–time region in which the forest fire
occurs. In addition, we need to specify whether we are talking about a fragile forest
fire, or a more robust forest fire, etc. It is only once we have managed to specify a
single event, corresponding to a particular answer to the question of fragility, that
we can consider the further question of how easily this event could have failed to
occur.
With this clarification in place, let me now illustrate the intuitive idea that some
events could easily have failed to occur, while others could not. As an example of an
event that could easily have failed to occur, consider a football player who takes a
free kick in an important match, and succeeds in scoring a goal. More precisely,
consider the fairly robust event of the goal, which is essentially the ball hitting the
back of the net, but whose precise time and manner of occurrence are not essential
to it. Let time t be the time at which the football player kicks the ball, and let
time T be the time at which the ball hits the back of the net. And suppose that, had
circumstances at time t been just ever so slightly different—if she had hit the ball
slightly differently, or hesitated for a moment, or if the other players had moved just
slightly differently—the ball would not have found the back of the net at all. In that
case, we intuitively judge that—based on the circumstances at time t—the goal
could easily have failed to happen. And, importantly, the reason why we reach this
judgement is that, had things been just slightly different at time t, the goal would not
have happened.
As an example of an event that could not easily have failed to happen, consider
instead a football player who, during training, kicks the ball towards the middle of
an undefended goal. More precisely, consider, as above, the fairly robust event of
the goal. Once again, let t be the time at which the football player kicks the ball, and
let T be the time at which the ball hits the back of the net. In this case, it seems
reasonable to suppose that circumstances at time t would have to be very different in
order for her not to score. Correspondingly, we intuitively judge—based on the
circumstances at time t—that the goal could not easily have failed to happen. And,
as before, our judgement is based on an assessment of the extent to which the goal
depends on the precise circumstances at time t.
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In the following, I will use possible worlds to make this idea more precise. Let
me begin by introducing a particular notion of distance between worlds, namely the
notion of distance-at-a-time. The distance-at-time-t between two worlds, w and w*,
is a measure of the dissimilarity between the state of w at t and the state of w* at t:6
when the state of w at t is very similar to the state of w* at t, then there is only a
small distance-at-t between w and w*, i.e., w and w* are very close-at-t. When the
state of w at t is very dissimilar from the state of w* at t, then there is a large
distance-at-t between w and w*, i.e., w and w* are very distant-at-t. I will say that a
world w* is closest-at-t to a world w just in case there is no world w** such that the
distance-at-t between w and w** is strictly smaller than the distance-at-t between
w and w* (note that this allows for more than one world being closest-at-t to w).
In the following, I will only consider worlds governed by deterministic laws.7
And, in considering a case governed by a particular set of laws, I will only consider
worlds governed by those same laws. Letting a not-E-world be a world that evolves
(in accordance with the relevant set of laws) such that event E does not occur in it,
we may now introduce the concept of security as follows:
Security: the security of an event E in a world w at a time t (where t may be
any time prior to E’s time of occurrence, and w may be any world) is given by
the distance-at-t between w and the not-E-world(s) that are closest-at-t to w.
If the not-E-world(s) that are closest-at-t to w are very distant-at-t, then E has a high
degree of security at t in w. If the not-E-world(s) that are closest-at-t to w are very
close-at-t, then E has a low degree of security at t in w.8
6 This seems to require us to pick out the same time—time t—in two different worlds, w1 and w2. One
might worry that this is not easy to do. However, there are ways around this difficulty. One option is the
following: suppose that we are interested in a particular time—time t—in w1. Instead of supposing that
there is a single correct way of picking out the same time in world w2, we allow that any time in w2 may
be picked out as time t. This yields a multitude of ways of picking out time t in world w2. For each
particular way of picking out time t in w2, we may then determine the distance-at-t between w1 and w2,
relative to that way of picking out time t in w2. A world w1 may then be close-at-t to w2 relative to one
way of picking out time t in w2, while it may not be close-at-t to w2 relative to another way of picking out
time t in w2. When I talk about ‘closeness-at-t’ in the following, one may therefore take this as shorthand
for ‘closeness-at-t, relative to a particular way of picking out time t’.
7 There is, in fact, good reason to believe that the actual laws of nature are not deterministic. However,
allowing for indeterministic laws would introduce further complications that I do not wish to consider
here. For that reason, I follow the common practice of assuming determinism (see e.g. Paul and Hall
2013: 8).
8 With this precise definition of security, we are now in a position to see how the concept of security
interacts with the concept of fragility: when we consider the occurrences in a particular space–time
region, such as the space–time region in which the forest burns, these occurrences correspond, as detailed
above, to a multitude of more or less fragile events. For a given earlier time t, we may now determine the
degree of security at time t of each of these more or less fragile events. Doing so, we find that there is a
systematic relationship between fragility and degree of security: roughly, increasing the fragility of an
event (i.e. considering more details of its time and manner of occurrence to be essential to it) lowers its
degree of security at the times before its occurrence. Considering the forest fire, for example, we find that
even though things would have to be very different at time t in order for the robust forest fire not to occur,
things would only have to be ever so slightly different in order for a particular fragile forest fire (occurring
essentially in a particular manner at a particular time) not to occur.
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Since we can evaluate an event E’s security at any time prior to E’s occurrence,
we may draw a graph of how E’s security evolves over time. Such a graph may, for
example, look like the one illustrated in Fig. 1. (This graph only contains
comparative information about how an event’s degree of security at one time relates
to its degree of security at earlier or later times. For this reason, no unit is required
on the y-axis. Indeed, it is an open question whether it is possible to find an absolute
measure of an event’s degree of security, and what the appropriate unit may be. For
now, however, comparisons of degrees of security are all we need.)
The concept of security makes precise our intuitive judgements about how easily
an event could have failed to occur, based on the circumstances at some earlier time:
saying that an event E has a low degree of security at an earlier time t captures the
idea that E could easily have failed to happen, based on the circumstances at t. And
saying that an event E has a high degree of security at an earlier time t captures the
idea that E could not easily have failed to happen, based on the circumstances at t.
As an illustration, let us once again consider the two football examples presented
above. Consider first the case of the football player who takes a free kick in an
important match. To assess the goal’s degree of security at the time t when she takes
the kick, we need to ask: how close-at-t are the closest-at-t possible worlds where
she does not score a goal? Based on my description of the case, we find that the
closest-at-t possible worlds where she does not score are very close-at-t: the state-at-
t of the closest-at-t no-goal-worlds differs only ever so slightly from the state-at-t of
the actual world. Thus, we find that the goal has a very low degree of security at t,
corresponding to the intuitive judgement that the goal could easily have failed to
happen, based on the circumstances at t.
By contrast, consider now the case of a football player who kicks the ball towards
the middle of an undefended goal during training. In this case, we find, based on my
description of the case, that the closest-at-t worlds where she does not score are very
distant-at-t: the closest-at-t worlds where she does not score are worlds where she
kicks the ball at a very different angle, or hesitates for a long time, or where the
other players are moving very differently. Thus, we find that the goal has a very high
degree of security at t, corresponding to the intuitive judgement that the goal could
not easily have failed to happen, based on the circumstances at time t.
Fig. 1 The graph illustrated here shows a typical evolution of an event’s security over time: at times long
before E’s occurrence, E has a very low degree of security, i.e. if things had been just slightly different at
these times, E would not have occurred. Closer to E’s occurrence, however, E’s degree of security begins
to grow, and just before E’s occurrence, E has a quite high degree of security, i.e. things would have to be
very different at this time in order for E not to occur
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4 Security-dependence
With the concept of security, we may now go on to consider how an event C
influences the security of a later event E, where we shall understand influence in
counterfactual terms. In particular, considering the time t at which C occurs, we may
ask: would E have been less secure at t, just as secure at t, or more secure at t, if
C had not occurred? For any event C and any later event E, C will be related to E in
exactly one of these three ways. I will call these three relations positive security-
dependence, security-independence and negative security-dependence. They may be
defined more precisely as follows:
Positive security-dependence: E security-depends positively on C, where
C occurs at time t,9 if and only if
1. C and E both occur, and
2. if C had not occurred, then E would have been less secure at t.
Security-independence: E is security-independent from C, where C occurs at
time t, if and only if
1. C and E both occur, and
2. if C had not occurred, then E would have been just as secure at t.
Negative security-dependence: E security-depends negatively on C, where
C occurs at time t, if and only if
1. C and E both occur, and
2. if C had not occurred, then E would have been more secure at t.
Considering an event C, occurring at time t, and a later event E, Fig. 2 illustrates a
case where E security-depends positively on C.
It is important to note that relations of security-dependence are doubly modal: the
notion of security is itself a modal notion—to evaluate an event’s security in a world
w at a time t, we need to consider the distance-at-t between w and other possible
worlds. And to evaluate which of the three relations holds between an event C,
which occurs at t, and a later event E, we then need to compare E’s actual degree of
security with the degree of security E would have had at t, if C had not occurred.
Thus, determining which of the three relations holds between an event C and a later
event E requires us to evaluate counterfactuals of the form ‘if C had not occurred,
then […]’. My preferred method for making these evaluations was originally
proposed by Maudlin (2007: 21–34), and Hall and Paul later tailored it specifically to
the needs of counterfactual theories of causation (see Hall 2007b: 17–21; Paul and
Hall 2013: 47–53). Paul and Hall (2013: 47–48) describe this method as follows:
Suppose event C occurs at t, and event E occurs later. To evaluate ‘‘if C had
not occurred, then […],’’ we construct a counterfactual state of the world at
9 In cases where C goes on for some time, the relevant time t is the time when C begins to occur. The
same applies to the following definitions.
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time t as much like the actual state at time t as possible, save for the fact that
C does not occur. […] We then evolve the resulting state forward in time, in
accordance with the actual laws of nature.10
Using this method for evaluating counterfactuals, we may determine, whenever we
have an event C and a later event E, whether E security-depends positively on C, is
security-independent from C, or security-depends negatively on C.
The distinction between these three different relations is metaphysically
significant. And I suggest that our causal judgements are sensitive to exactly this
distinction:
I. We judge that C is a cause of a later event E
only if E security-depends positively on C.
II. We judge that C is (causally) irrelevant to a later event E
if and only if E is security-independent from C.
III. We judge that E occurs in spite of C
if and only if E security-depends negatively on C.11
Hopefully, these claims already seem intuitively plausible.12 In the following, I
will now show how accepting them allows us to accurately capture our intuitive
judgements in both typical and atypical cases of hastening and delaying.
Fig. 2 The solid line–as in the previous graph—indicates how E’s degree of security evolves over time in
the actual world. The dotted line, on the other hand, indicates how E’s degree of security evolves from time
t onwards in the closest possible world where C does not occur. (The figure does not show how E’s degree of
security evolves until time t in the closest not-C-world; the reason for this is that my preferred way of
evaluating counterfactuals simply remains silent on what happens in the closest not-C-world until the
relevant time t.) Since the dotted line lies below the solid line at time t, the diagram shows that E is less secure
at t in the closest not-C-world than it is in the actual world, and thus E security-depends positively onC. Note
that since E still occurs in the closest not-C-world, E does not depend counterfactually on C in this example
10 As Paul and Hall (2013: 49–53) point out, there is a further question of what exactly replaces C in the
closest-at-t world(s) where C does not occur. For discussion, see, e.g., Schaffer (2005: 302–306), Hall
(2007a: 125) and Hitchcock (2007: 506–507).
11 Note that positive security-dependence is necessary, but not sufficient, for our judgement that C is a
cause of E. By contrast, security-independence is both necessary and sufficient for the judgement that C is
causally irrelevant to E, and negative security-dependence is both necessary and sufficient for the
judgement that E occurs in spite of C.
12 I provide further support for these claims in my paper ‘Security-dependence and the intransitivity of
causation’ (ms).
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5 Security-dependence in typical cases of hastening and delaying
In this section, I will show how, in typical cases of hastening, the hastened event
security-depends positively on the event that hastens it, whereas, in typical cases of
delaying, the delayed event security-depends negatively on the event that delays it.
This difference, I suggest, explains the asymmetry in our judgements.
To show this, I will consider the representative examples presented by Hastened
forest fire and Delayed forest fire. Consider first Hastened forest fire, which provides
an example of a typical case of hastening, where we judge that the hastener is a
cause of the event it hastens. My claim is that the forest fire—considered as a fairly
robust event, in keeping with what I have said in Sect. 2 above—security-depends
positively on the May lightning. To see this, we will need to consider the three
possible worlds shown in Fig. 3.
More precisely, we need to consider the state of each of these three worlds at
the time t when the May lightning occurs. To see that the forest fire security-
depends positively on the May lightning, we may now proceed in the following
three steps:
Step 1: assessing the forest fire’s degree of security at t in @: relative to @, the
closest-at-t world where the forest fire does not occur is w*. Thus, the forest fire’s
degree of security at t in @ is given by the distance-at-t between @ and w*.
Step 2: assessing the degree of security that the forest fire would have had at t, if
the May lightning had not occurred: relative to @, the closest-at-t world where the
May lightning does not occur is w. (This is confirmed by the intuitive judgement
that, if the May lighting had not occurred, the forest would have burned in June: this
judgement shows that we take the closest-at-t world where the May lightning does
not occur to be a world in which the June lightning still occurs.) Relative to w, the
closest-at-t world where the forest fire does not occur is w*. Thus, the degree of
security that forest fire would have had at t, if the May lightning had not occurred, is
given by the distance-at-t between w and w*.
Step 3: comparing the forest fire’s degree of security at t in @ with the degree of
security it would have had at t, if the May lightning had not occurred: intuitively,
the distance-at-t between w and w* is smaller than the distance-at-t between @ and
w*. Thus, the forest fire would have been less secure at t, if the May lightning had
not occurred, i.e. the forest fire security-depends positively on the May lightning.
Fig. 3 The three worlds that are relevant for evaluating security-dependence in Hastened forest fire; I
have used italics to emphasise differences from the actual world @. Note that I have put the actual world,
@, on the far left, since this order of the worlds best reflects the comparative similarity between them
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Now consider Delayed forest fire, as an example of a typical case of delaying,
where we judge that the delayer is not a cause of the event it delays. My claim is that
the forest fire security-depends negatively on the heavy rain in April, which delays
its occurrence. To see this, we will need to consider the three possible worlds shown
in Fig. 4.
More precisely, we need to consider the state of each of these three worlds at the
time t when the April rain begins. To see that the forest fire security-depends
negatively on the April rain, we now proceed in the same three steps as above:
Step 1: assessing the forest fire’s degree of security at t in @: relative to @, the
closest-at-t world where the forest fire does not occur is w*. Thus, the forest fire’s
degree of security at t in @ is given by the distance-at-t between @ and w*.
Step 2: assessing the degree of security that the forest fire would have had at t, if
the April rain had not occurred: relative to @, the closest-at-t world where the April
rain does not occur is w. (This is confirmed by the intuitive judgement that if the
April rain had not occurred, the forest would have burned already in May.) Relative
to w, the closest-at-t world where the forest fire does not occur is w*. Thus, the
degree of security that the forest fire would have had at t, if the April rain had not
occurred, is given by the distance-at-t between w and w*.
Step 3: comparing the forest fire’s degree of security at t in @ with the degree of
security it would have had at t, if the April rain had not occurred: intuitively, the
distance-at-t between w and w* is larger than the distance-at-t between @ and w*.
Thus, the forest fire would have been more secure at t, if the April rain had not
occurred, i.e. the forest fire security-depends negatively on the April rain.
These results show that there is a metaphysically significant difference between
the way in which the May lightning is related to the forest fire in Hastened forest
fire, and the way in which the April rain is related to the forest fire in Delayed forest
fire: the forest fire in Hastened forest fire security-depends positively on the May
lightning, while the forest fire in Delayed forest fire security-depends negatively on
the April rain. This difference, I suggest, explains the asymmetry in our causal
judgements:
When an event E security-depends positively on an earlier event C, we judge
(provided other reasonable conditions for causation are satisfied) that C is a cause of
E. Thus, the fact that the forest fire in Hastened forest fire security-depends
Fig. 4 The three worlds that are relevant for evaluating security-dependence in Delayed forest fire; I
have used italics to emphasise differences from the actual world @. Note that @ is here placed in the
middle; this is intended to reflect the fact that w differs from @ in one way, while w* differs from @ in
another way
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positively on the May lightning explains (provided reasonable conditions are
satisfied) our judgement that the May lightning is among its causes. When, on the
other hand, an event E security-depends negatively on an earlier event C, we judge
that C is not a cause of E—rather, E occurs in spite of C. Thus, the fact that the
forest fire in Delayed forest fire security-depends negatively on the April rain
explains our judgement that the April rain is not a cause of the forest fire—and that,
rather, the forest burns in spite of the April rain.
6 Atypical cases of hastening and delaying
In this section, I will consider atypical cases of hastening, where we judge that a
hastener is not a cause of what it hastens, and atypical cases of delaying, where we
judge that a delayer is a cause of what it delays. In these atypical cases, I will show
that the hastened event does not security-depend positively on the event that hastens
it, whereas the delayed event does security-depend positively on the event that
delays it. This explains why our judgements about these atypical cases are reversed
relative to our judgements about typical cases of hastening and delaying.
To show this, I will begin by considering the representative examples presented
by The holiday and Fatal antidote. Consider first The holiday, presented in Sect. 1,
which provides an example of an atypical case of hastening. In The holiday, Suzy is
planning to go to Greece in October. However, a change in the October teaching
schedule makes it impossible for her to go then. Although she would have preferred
to go in October, she therefore changes her plans and goes to Greece in September
instead. Thus, the change in the October teaching schedule hastens her trip.
However, we intuitively judge that the change is not a cause of her trip—rather, she
manages to go in spite of the change. Correspondingly, Suzy’s trip to Greece in fact
security-depends negatively on the change in the October teaching schedule. To see
this, we will need to consider the three possible worlds shown in Fig. 5.
More precisely, we need to consider the state of each of these three possible
worlds at the time t when the October teaching schedule changes. We may now
proceed in the usual three steps:
Fig. 5 The three worlds that are relevant for evaluating security-dependence in The holiday; I have used
italics to emphasise differences from the actual world @. Note that I have put the actual world, @, in the




Step 1: assessing the trip’s degree of security at t in @: relative to @, the closest-
at-t world where Suzy does not go to Greece is w*. Thus, the trip’s security at t in @
is given by the distance-at-t between @ and w*.
Step 2: assessing the degree of security that the trip would have had at t, if the
October teaching schedule had not changed: relative to @, the closest-at-t world
where the teaching schedule does not change is w. (This is confirmed by the
intuitive judgement that, if the teaching schedule had not changed, Suzy would have
gone to Greece in October.) Relative to w, the closest-at-t world where Suzy does
not go to Greece is w*. Thus, the degree of security that the trip would have had at t,
if the October teaching schedule had not changed, is given by the distance-at-
t between w and w*.
Step 3: comparing the trip’s degree of security at t in @ with the degree of
security it would have had at t, if the October teaching schedule had not changed:
intuitively, the distance-at-t between w and w* is larger than the distance-at-
t between @ and w*. Thus, the trip would have been more secure at t, if the teaching
schedule had not changed, i.e. the trip security-depends negatively on the change in
the October teaching schedule.
This result explains our judgement that the change in the October teaching
schedule is not a cause of Suzy’s trip. Furthermore, it fits perfectly with the nuances
of our judgement: as I have suggested above, when an event E security-depends
negatively on an earlier event C, we judge that E occurs in spite of C. This
suggestion fits exactly with our intuitive judgement in the present case, where it
seems appropriate to say that Suzy manages to go on her trip to Greece in spite of
the change in the October teaching schedule.
Now consider the atypical case of delaying presented in Fatal antidote. In Fatal
antidote, presented in Sect. 1, Billy is bitten by a snake and is immediately given an
antidote to the snake’s poison.He dies twelve hours later from a reaction to the antidote;
if he had not been given the antidote, he would instead have died just two hours after the
snake-bite. Here, we intuitively judge that the delayer—namely, Billy’s being given the
antidote—is a cause of the delayed event, i.e. Billy’s death. Correspondingly, Billy’s
death security-depends positively on his being given the antidote. To see this, we will
need to consider the three possible worlds shown in Fig. 6.
More precisely, we need to consider the state of each of these three worlds at the
time t when Billy is given the antidote. We may again proceed in the usual three
steps.
Fig. 6 The three worlds that are relevant for evaluating security-dependence in Fatal antidote; I have
used italics to emphasise differences from the actual world @. Note that I have put the actual world, @,
on the far left, since this order of the worlds best reflects the comparative similarity between them
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Step 1: assessing the degree of security of Billy’s death at t in @: relative to @,
the closest-at-t world where Billy doesn’t die is w*. Thus, his death’s degree of
security at t in @ is given by the distance-at-t between @ and w*.
Step 2: assessing the degree of security that Billy’s death would have had at t, if
he had not been given the antidote: relative to @, the closest-at-t world where Billy
is not given the antidote is w. (This is confirmed by the intuitive judgement that
Billy would have died already two hours after the snake-bite, if he had not been
given the antidote.) Relative to w, the closest-at-t world where Billy doesn’t die is
w*. Thus, the degree of security that Billy’s death would have had, if he had not
been given the antidote, is given by the distance-at-t between w and w*.
Step 3: comparing the degree of security of Billy’s death at t in @ with the degree
of security that his death would have had at t, if he had not been given the antidote:
intuitively, the distance-at-t between w and w* is smaller than the distance-at-
t between @ and w*. Thus, Billy’s death would have been less secure at t, if he had
not been given the antidote, i.e. Billy’s death security-depends positively on his
being given the antidote.
This result—together with the satisfaction of reasonable conditions—allows us to
judge that being given the antidote is a cause of Billy’s death.
The holiday and Fatal antidote are examples of atypical cases where a hastened
event security-depends negatively on the event that hastens it, while a delayed event
security-depends positively on the event that delays it. However, as one might
expect from the fact that we have distinguished three possible relationships—
positive security-dependence, negative security-dependence, and security-indepen-
dence—there is a further kind of atypical cases: cases where the event that is
hastened (or delayed) is simply security-independent from the hastener (or delayer).
The following is an example of this type of case:
Train tracks: A train is approaching a fork in the tracks. Suzy turns the lever in
the signal box from left to right, so that the train travels down the right-hand
track and arrives at its destination at 12 noon. If Suzy had not turned the lever,
the train would instead have travelled down the slightly longer left-hand track,
arriving five minutes past noon.13
Considering the fairly robust event of the train’s arrival at some time around noon,
we find that this event would have happened whether or not Suzy had turned the
lever. Suzy’s turning the lever simply hastens the train’s arrival. As Mackie (1992:
496) notes,
13 Cf. Mackie (1992: 496). This case has been much discussed in the literature (see, for example, Hall
2000: 205; Hall 2007a: 118; Paul and Hall 2013: 232; Sartorio 2005: 74–75). The reason why this case
has received so much attention is that it presents a counterexample to the transitivity of causation:
intuitively, Suzy’s turning the lever causes the train’s journey along the right-hand track, and the train’s
journey along the right-hand track in turn causes its arrival, but our intuitive judgement is that Suzy’s
turning the lever is not a cause of the train’s arrival. This suggests that the distinction between positive
security-dependence, security-independence, and negative security-dependence may, in addition to
explaining our judgements about hasteners and delayers, provide an explanation of what happens in the
counterexamples to the transitivity of causation. I develop this idea in my paper ‘Security-dependence and
the intransitivity of causation’ (ms).
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one feels uncomfortable about saying that this […] hastener—turning the
lever—causes the train’s arrival. And the same is true of the […] delayer we
get if we modify the example so that [Suzy’s] action is to turn the lever from
right to left.
Intuitively, it seems right to say that Suzy’s turning the lever is simply irrelevant to
the train’s arrival. Correspondingly, we find that the train’s arrival is security-
independent from Suzy’s turning the lever: considering the time t when Suzy turns
the lever, and assuming that the two tracks are relevantly similar (apart from the fact
that one is slightly longer than the other), we find that the train’s arrival would have
been just as secure at t, if Suzy had not turned the lever. This, I suggest, is the
reason why we judge that Suzy’s turning the lever is not a cause of the train’s
arrival, and that, instead, it is simply irrelevant to the train’s arrival.
7 Explaining the asymmetry between typical cases of hastening
and delaying
So far, we have seen how the asymmetry in our judgements about hasteners and
delayers results from the fact that our causal judgements are sensitive to the deep
metaphysical distinction between positive security-dependence, security-indepen-
dence, and negative security-dependence. However, a question still remains: why
does the surface level distinction between hastening and delaying so often line up
with this deep metaphysical distinction? In other words: why do hastened events so
often security-depend positively on the events that hasten them, and why do delayed
events so often security-depend negatively on the events that delay them?
The key to answering this question, I suggest, is to see how hastening and
delaying is connected with preemption. For hasteners, I suggest that:
(i) Hasteners are typically preempting causes of what they hasten.14
(ii) Effects always security-depend positively on their preempting causes.15
Similarly, for delayers I suggest that:
(i) Delayers typically block a would-be preempting cause of what they delay.
(ii) Effects always security-depend negatively on events that block their would-be
preempting causes.
I cannot offer complete arguments for these two sets of claims. Rather, I will
merely point out that they both fit perfectly with typical cases of hastening and
delaying. Consider, for example, Hastened forest fire: the structure of Hastened
14 See e.g. Yablo (2004: 131). As has often been noted, the converse also holds: preempting causes are
often (though not always) hasteners (see e.g. Yablo 2004: 132; Paul 1998).
15 I argue more fully for this claim in my paper ‘Security-dependence and the intransitivity of causation’
(ms).
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forest fire is a typical preemption structure, where the May lightning is a preempting
cause of the forest fire, while the June lightning is a preempted backup. And in
Sect. 5 we have already seen that—in accordance with my claim that effects always
security-depend positively on their preempting causes—the forest fire security-
depends positively on its preempting cause, i.e. on the May lightning.
Now consider Delayed forest fire. The crucial thing to notice here is that
Hastened forest fire and Delayed forest fire are closely related: Hastened forest fire
shows what would have happened in Delayed forest fire if the April rain had not
occurred. Keeping this in mind, we see that Delayed forest fire’s rain in April
interferes with the preemption structure exhibited in Hastened forest fire: the April
rain blocks a would-be preempting cause of the forest fire (namely, the May
lightning), leaving the forest fire to be caused by what would otherwise have been a
mere backup (namely, the June lightning). And in Sect. 5 we have already seen that
the forest fire security-depends negatively on the April rain that blocks the would-be
preempting cause.
Both of the suggested explanations lead to further questions: why are hasteners
often preempting causes? And why do delayers often block would-be preempting
causes of what they delay? My tentative answer is that introducing a preempting
cause is an obvious way to hasten an event, while blocking a would-be preempting
cause is an obvious way to delay it. Consider, for example, Billy who is planning (as
usual) to break a window. If Billy is taking his time, enjoying the sunshine before
throwing his rock at the window, Suzy can hasten the breaking of the window by
introducing a preempting cause—viz., by throwing a rock of her own. And if Sally
stumbles on this situation and wants to delay the breaking of the window, she can do
so by blocking the would-be preempting cause—viz., by running up to Suzy and
preventing her from throwing, leaving the breaking of the window to the slower
Billy.
In atypical cases, however, it is possible to hasten something by blocking a
would-be preempting cause, or to delay something by introducing a preempting
cause. This, indeed, is exactly what happens in our two atypical cases of hastening
and delaying: The holiday and Fatal antidote.
When we look more closely at The holiday, we find that the change in the
teaching schedule blocks a would-be preempting cause: in the counterfactual
situation where there is no change in the teaching schedule, Suzy has the option of
going to Greece in September and the option of going to Greece in October, and she
prefers to go in October. In this counterfactual situation, then, Suzy’s being free in
October is a preempting cause of her going to Greece, while her being free in
September is a mere preempted backup. The change in the teaching schedule thus
hastens her trip by blocking a would-be preempting cause—namely, Suzy’s being
free to go on a later trip in October—so that the trip to Greece has to fall back on
Suzy’s being free in September.
When we look more closely at the structure of Fatal antidote, on the other hand,
we find that it has an early preemption structure: the antidote cuts off the process
initiated by the snake’s poison; however, the antidote subsequently brings about
Billy’s death on its own, though more slowly. In this atypical case, we thus have a




In typical cases, we judge that hasteners are causes of what they hasten, while
delayers are not causes of what they delay. This asymmetry presents a puzzle: why
do we treat hasteners and delayers differently in this way? Mackie (1992: 487) sums
up the question nicely as follows:
the central question, applied to the example of the forest fire, can be stated as
follows. There is a relation that holds between the rain and the occurrence of
the fire that it delays. And there is a relation that holds between the lightning
and the occurrence of the fire that it hastens. What is the difference between
these relations that makes it natural to regard the lightning, but not the rain, as
a cause of the fire?
My suggested answer to this question is that the fire security-depends positively on
the lightning, whereas it security-depends negatively on the rain. More fully, my
suggestion is that there is a deep metaphysical distinction between three ways in
which an event E may be related to an earlier event C: E may security-depend
positively on C, E may be security-independent from C, or E may security-depend
negatively on C. This deep metaphysical distinction typically (but not always) lines
up with the surface level distinction between hastening and delaying, and our
sensitivity to this deep distinction explains our judgements in both typical and
atypical cases of hastening and delaying.
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